Review of Davis, John B. 2011. Individuals and Identity in Economics. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Essence
Starting at the end of the 260 page book, Davis (2011, pp. 234-236) points to the overall concern throughout is with the meaning of an individual --- a person’s identity --- in economics. The book is about characterizing the “… two criteria necessary for explaining individuals – individuation and reidentification… (and because reidentification through time could cause more than oneself, Davis makes a “… case for saying that individuals do not dissolve into multiple selves and can be individuated as single individuals…” Also, a major claim is that reidentification evolves through the interaction and relations with others.
Using Dual Interest Theory (DIT) in Metaeconomics to make sense of such claims, Davis in effect shifts the conversation from the Single Interest Theory (SIT), self-interest only frame, in mainstream Microeconomics which is focused on the max U preference. Davis transcends the idea of an individual as just being identified as an Econ (Homo economicus) --- the max U in a self-interest only mode, and away from preferences toward the capacity to build capability to be and to do. Said, somewhat differently, Davis transcends the identity of just an Econ as represented in the max U preference framework and moves to represent the person as a Human (Homo sapiens) with the capacity to build capabilities.
Said Human capabilities have two dimensions, one in the domain of the self and the other being shared with and enhanced through interaction with others. Relationships matter, so Davis brings the other Humans, the society within which each person is embedded, into view. Davis brings attention to both private capability and shared capability with other, the latter especially involved in reidentification of the identity. An identity evolves through the relationships with the other, with said relationships giving the reidentification. So, reidentification involves the other.
DIT is flexible enough to deal with preferences, capacities, and capabilities. It also recognizes, as does Davis (2011), the dual nature of a Human. So, with preferences, DIT points to joint self U & other (shared) U. Capacity is addressed by the DIT notion that Humans have evolved with the capacity for ego-based self-interest and empathy-based other (shared yet internalized within the own-self)-interest: Good balance is representing homeostasis in the joint ego & empathy with the Human brain. Capability in DIT is represented the private (capital) investment in building capability to act on the ego-based self-interest. DIT points to the other capability developed with the public (shared as in social capital) investment in the capability that comes from working with the other toward shared ends.
SIT sees only private preferences and never addresses capacity and capability. SIT sees only preferences represented in the idea of max self-interest U. And, when it is reluctantly acknowledged in SIT that the other person matters at all, sometimes SIT is patched with the idea of the relation with the other being a kind of externality, fixed with interdependent utility theory. Not.
The Review is offered in the frame of, first, looking for further empirical support for DIT, and, second, to see if DIT helps make easier sense of the claims, especially in adding analytical power to the Davis claims. The Review refers to Figures 1 and 2 (see Details below) throughout, which are standard offerings in representing DIT (See Lynne and Czap 2013; also see the connection with Humanomics, which introduces the notion of the Profane self-interest and the Sacred other(shared in relationships)-interest; see Lynne In Review, and https://www.metaeconomics.info/profane-sacred-and-the-law).
Davis ends the book, last paragraph (p. 236): “Of course, the capabilities conception of the individual developed here possesses many ambiguities and problematic aspects, as one would expect of any examination of individuals and identity. However, if my discussion has often not been persuasive, I hope to at least have convinced readers of the seriousness of the issue and its fundamental importance.” Overall, DIT like Davis (2011) sees the seriousness and fundamental importance of the issue of identity of Human, as SIT fails to do so. The failure to do so in SIT is made clear in both DIT and Davis (2011). Also, then, DIT is given more credence by the claims in Davis, and the claims in Davis are given more credence by DIT. So, for the details, keep going!
Details
Davis (2011) is organized in 3 parts and 10 chapters. The Review now turns to using Figure 1 representing the Market Forum and Figure 2 representing the Other Forum of Community: Government, the “:” meaning a truly representative, inclusive Government, to make sense of it.
Part 1 Atomism Revised
Using DIT framing, the Chapters in Part 1 focus on the need to consider moving beyond the atomism of self-interest only in SIT on path 0G in Figure 1 to see how identity relates to the other, how identity relates to the larger society within which the person is embedded as represented on path 0M in Figure 1, and the Other Forums within which a person interacts as represented in Figure 2. Part 1 addresses the topics: psychology’s challenge to economics; multiple selves and self-control; social identity and social preferences in the utility function.
Psychology’s Challenge
Davis frames the matter with the claim that “… psychology offers two different critiques of standard rationality theory associated with two different underlying conceptions of the individual, one that largely takes over and revises economics’ atomistic individual conception and one that clearly rejects it (p. 25). Related to Behavioral Economics (which draws heavily on Psychology), Davis sees the former in the “new” framing as in the work of Kahneman and Tversky and the latter by the “old” framing in the work of Herbert Simon.
Davis claims “old” Behavioral Economics to include Herbert Simon replaces the atomistic version with an ecological version, the latter point to a better path 0Z. Davis claims the “new” Behavioral Economics of Kahneman and Tversky retains the atomistic version and just speaks of some limitations of the person, just revising the atomistic version, seeing only path 0G. Well, DIT is more in tune with the “old” than the Davis version of “new” … and, DIT is actually the really new Behavioral Economics, seeing Dual Interest as inherent in Human Biology.
Davis claims both psychological approaches “… fail to develop an adequate conception of the individual… (pp. 27- 28).” Davis moves away from preferences in U terms toward capabilities, which DIT can accommodate, as DIT, too, moves away from preferences reflected in self U & other U toward evolved ego & empathy tendencies in the evolved brain as represented in self & other-interest. A person satisfies interests with capability in each domain of interest, capability on both path 0G and path 0M on the way to using the private and public (shared with the other) capability jointly applied on path 0Z.
Multiple Selves and Self Control
The multiple selves issue arises because an individual interacts with the other, and, then, is reidentified from that interaction. Think of the person identified on path 0G interacting with the other on path 0M which results in a reidentification on the trajectory of path 0Z. Multiple selves are just different trajectories of an ever evolving and changing path 0Z, while the core identity is maintained on the stable path 0G. Simple.
Davis says, after considering some of the Kahneman and Tversky work, especially on prospect theory which is all about context, “… it is fair to say that individual value functions are also likely contextualized by various types of characteristically social phenomena, such as social group membership, social identities, and social norms – (pp. 33-34).” Yes. DIT represents contextualized individual value functions represented on path 0Z, to include influence on path 0G from such things as social group membership, social identities, social norms all represented in the shared other-interest of alternative path 0M trajectories. Multiple selves are represented in each of the trajectories.
And, on self-control: “Homo sapiens (also) regularly exhibits what is known as weakness of will when people’s current selves plan for the future and are later overruled by their future current selves who reject earlier plans. Jon Elster previously brought the concept of weakness of will … (p. 49).” Yes, in the sirens. Easily handled in DIT as the weakness of will can lead a person to return to the primal path 0G when the better path 0Z cannot be reached (bind me to the mast, as Elster said).
Davis claims difficulty in explaining the source of self-control, pointing to how “Elster fails to properly locate where individual control mechanisms reside, as the evidence indicates that individuals are unable to constrain themselves per se (p. 67).” Well, modern behavioral science clarifies it is in the Reflective Mind (after Stanovich ???) that control arises, and it can be quite rational. So, the notion of self-control is easily explained in DIT in the overlayer of the Reflective Mind, which works with the Algorithmic (thinking, considering options) mind to strike a balance in the Ego & Empathy parts of the Human brain.
Social Identity and Social Preferences in the Utility Function
Davis now turns to two further behavioral economics strategies for advancing the standard individual conception: “Akerlof and Kranton’s inclusion of social identities in individuals’ utility functions and a number of different accounts of how individuals’ utility functions include social preferences (p. 68).” So, staying with only the max U of path 0G, “….rather than contextualize individuality (and subjectivity) by placing individuals in a world in which they interact with others, they internalize sociality by giving the utility function an unmistakably social dimension (p. 69).” Huge mistake. As DIT clarifies, it is all about the interaction with the other, not about inserting the preferences of the other into the max U function: It has no credibility because one can never know the U of another to insert into the max U function. Davis also points to the “…social preferences approach developed by James Andreoni, Matthew Rabin, Ernst Fehr, Klaus Schmidt… (p. 69).”
The flawed idea was that “… a significant innovation in modeling identity (was to insert) an argument in the individual utility function seen as ‘a new type of externality’ (quoting Akerlof and Kranton) (p. 71).” So, the U of the other person is inserted into the max U on path 0G. The problem is: A person operating on path 0G can never know the U of some other person. It is patently impossible to know that U. So, it cannot be treated as some kind of knowable externality.
Now, some hope is pointed to in Davis with: “Akerlof and Kranton emphasize that social psychology has valuable resources to offer to economics, and the proponents of social preferences draw on extensive experimental evidence to reject the idea that individuals act only out of self-interest (e.g., Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1986a, 1986b). Thus, they agree that economics needs to become more realistic, where this means greater psychological realism (p. 70).” Well, the claim is correct in the sense of the Human not being only about self-interest. DIT clarifies the Human has, instead, a joint self & other-interest. DIT was built starting with social psychology with the attitudes & norms model. So, it is not an exernality kind of problem, as both the attitudes & norms, the self & other (shared)-interest, is internalized within the own-self-interest, as DIT illustrates in Figure 1. DIT is very much consistent with framing in social psychology, and in the early years of developing the empirical foundation of DIT, many of the empirical techniques developed in social psychology were applied to the task (see Lynnee… the social pscyh papers).
Davis then turns to the equally flawed social preferences approach… “Social preferences, or other-regarding preferences, are individual preferences not motivated by self-interest but rather by material payoffs to others (referring to work by Fehr and Fischbacher) …and individuals are accordingly seen as having both self-regarding preferences and other-regarding social preferences in their individual utility functions (p. 83).” Not. As DIT makes clear, putting the material payoffs to others in the max U function is impossible as one can know what said payoffs are, one can never know the U of the other person. Other-regarding can only go to the point of mindful consideration of the other, while never being able to put the other in the max U function on path 0G.
Davis is struggling here, as he says that if “we are building on the standard Homo economicus model but want it to include a social orientation, the appropriate way to proceed would seem to be, like Akerlof and Kranton, in terms of the idea of an externality, though one now seen as positive (p. 88).” Well, Davis could solve the problem using DIT. The problem is, one cannot use SIT to explain any of the four social preferences alluded to, as impure altruism, fairness, inequity aversion, sacrificing a bit but still wanting some efficiency, as all would have be represented on the max U path 0Z. Instead, such considerations have to be on a path 0M, such that some sacrifice in moving away from path 0G can be demonstrated. Such sacrifice is essential in all four dimensions, so SIT is illogical as one cannot max U while sacrificing U.
Davis comes around and almost gets it here: “However, interpreting social preferences as a form of empathy produces a clear multiple selves problem for the social preference approach (p. 89)… would then mean that individuals are actually somehow made up of multiple selves or utility functions: the self or utility function that applies to the preferences specific to them and selves or utility functions that apply to the preferences of others with whom they empathize (or identify) (pp. 89-90)…. (in effect recognizing an) important difference in nature and origin between ordinary preferences and social preferences … the latter … based on imagining others’ ordinary preferences (p. 90).” Yes, John Davis, you got it. The ego self U & empathy other U exist jointly within the person. The other U comes from empathy-with the other. Davis is in effect describing DIT.
Part 2 Interaction
Davis then turns to the reality that people interact with others, which is denied in SIT. In DIT terms, the individual acting from the situation of path 0G interacts with the other represented on path 0M, which is resolved on some evolving, changing path 0Z.
The Individual in Game Theory
Davis points to two different approaches in Game Theory: “one emphasizes single-play (and finitely repeated) noncooperative games and has been developed in an a priori logical-deductive manner; the other emphasizes indefinitely repeated play games that may be cooperative and has been developed through experimental investigation (p. 95).” Well, the first one stirs only the ego on path 0G. The second one stirs the empathy on path 0M, which then brings the person to a solution on path 0Z. Davis emphasizes that “Repeated play also complicates the conception of individuals in games because of their propensity to behave cooperatively, contrary to the standard Homo economicus view (pp. 96-97).” To be more accurate, it transcends SIT, more exactly, as cooperation comes out of empathy-with the other, the missed interest of a real Human, who is not an Econ.
Davis points to the folk theorem in Game Theory, which describes a situation where people learn to cooperate. Naturally, because in repeated games, infinitely repeated to be exact, empathy-with plays out in a shared other-interest that works for everyone player. “Research into indefinitely repeated-play games has from the beginning brought into question the Homo economicus conception. Contrary to that view, experimental evidence has long shown that individuals in indefinitely repeated games often cooperate rather than simply pursue their own payoffs (p. 106).” Just more empirical evidence supporting DIT, and the cooperation arising on path 0Z rather than pursue only self-interest on path 0G. Makes full sense, as interaction among people brings empathy-with the fore, and empathy-with is a key aspect of Human experience through evolution. “The individual’s identity… is somehow a relational identity… a relational conception of the individual … (pp. 115-116).” Well, yes: The individual is defined, the identity of the individual is revealed, on path 0Z, which is relational.
Multiple Selves in Interaction
Davis points to “… recent game-theory-based views that reject the atomistic individual conception and explain how people seen to have multiple selves can be thought to be single individuals. Interaction is central to understanding individuals… (p. 118).” Refers to several researchers: “… Michael Bacharach’s view in which individuals have multiple selves because they identify with different social groups, but in which these multiple selves also identify with the single individual understood as a team … Don Ross’s neuroeconomics individual conception in which people’s different neural selves are relatively independent agents that play intrapersonal games with one another that produce single unified individuals who then play interpersonal games with one another … as coordination games (p. 118).”
Bacharach’s view … draws on social psychology’s social identity theory, and … explicitly makes use of self-categorization theory … individuals develop different self-concepts for themselves associated with their identification with different social groups … makes group identification a psychological phenomenon rather than the result of rational choice … though allows that individuals nonetheless need to recognize that they have a common interest in being members of a team … that gets represented by a group utility or payoff function that individuals then seek to maximize by fulfilling their roles as members of the team… (p. 121).” Well, DIT clarifies it is the utility on path 0M that is at play in the shared and common interest. And, the person maintains individuality as path 0G is relatively stable, albeit tempering same with path 0M considerations is ongoing in regular interaction through time.
Davis turns to a Ross and the neuroeconomics approach, going to neural systems within the brain. Ross’s neurocellular economics understanding of neuroeconomics follows in the line of thinking initiated by psychiatrist George Ainslie that starts with individuals’ multiple selves… Individuals are collections of optimizing sub-personal neural agents who interact in coordination games internal to the individual… (p. 127).” Yes: DIT, too. Sub-personal neural agents represented in the tendency to ego and the capacity for empathy to temper same.
Ross sees a “… game-theoretic world is one in which collections of neural agents successfully play coordination games with other collections of neural agents that lead to interpersonal games between whole individuals (p. 128).” And, yes, the key role of empathy-based altruism could be at play “… because evolution has confined sets of sub-personal neural agents to the same individual human bodies, it turns out to be symbiotically in their interest to cooperate with one another in order that the body they jointly inhabit survives. Further, as the whole individual’s survival also depends on interaction with other whole individuals … (Ross) … makes the whole individual the product of both interpersonal and intrapersonal interaction (p. 128).” Again, altruism (selflessness) wins, selfishness loses. Davis points out that Ross brings the two sides of the person together through evolution: DIT sees it the same way.
Evolution and the Individual
Davis now develops an evolutionary-relational conception of the individual “… addition of evolutionary thinking appropriates and employs the concept of a self-organizing entity to attribute to the individual the idea of being a self-sustaining subject (p. 139).” DIT makes it clear that evolution is key, as it is the evolution of empathy-with the other which works to sustain the person over-time, through evolution. Davis “… tracks the development of an evolutionary conception of the individual … begins in the immediate postwar period with Simon’s environmental or ecological rationality conception of individuals that emphasizes the idea that individuals function homeostatically (p. 142) … discusses Simon’s early rejection of utility functions and his strategy of explaining individuals in terms of aspiration levels and the environments they occupy (p. 143).” Both ideas consistent with DIT. Simon referring to homeostasis also makes full sense on path 0Z.
Davis then brings in Vernon Smith’s constructivist rationality and ecological rationality. “Constructivist rationality… is rationality in the traditional sense: conscious, deliberative, and deductive – in a word, Cartesian (p. 150)… (but it is) important to be sensitive to the fact that human institutions and most decision making are not guided only or primarily by constructivism. Emergent arrangements, even if initially constructivist in form, must have fitness properties that take account of opportunity costs and environmental challenges invisible to our modeling efforts (pp. 150-151)… (so need to also see) ecological rationality, in which the ‘behavior of an individual, a market, an institution, or other social system … is adapted to the structure of its environment (quoting Vernon Smith) (pp. 150-151).” DIT handles it easily: The structure of the environment is given by an array of path 0M trajectories which must be considered, and, may well influence the “constructivist” choice on path 0Z…. the repeat interactions in economic experiments demonstrating same.
Davis then turns to Binmore, and the Game of Life. Binmore “… argues that cooperative norms such as fairness as reciprocity or reciprocal altruism (sharing in response to sharing) have natural origins in the evolution of close-knit kin groups in early human societies, and that this principle has taken on a variety of different forms in modern societies when extended to nonkin according to these societies’ various cultural histories. … that social interaction can be broadly represented as a ‘game of life’ modeled as an indefinitely repeated game that can accordingly be understood in terms of game theory’s folk theorem (thus aptly named) (pp. 154-155).” Yes: The folk theorem arises out of the fact that empathy-with the other on the way to forming a shared other-interest is at play.
Davis points to learning and empathy: As Binmore says, it comes from “empathetic identification … a capacity to identify empathetically with one another (p. 158) … empathizing with another person involves somehow putting oneself in their place and imagining seeing things as they would. That includes seeing oneself as they would. Thus, the capacity to empathetically identify with others in social interaction means that one’s self-concept is an object for oneself in some degree detached from one’s own perception of it (p. 159).” Yes. Absolutely. Easy sense made with DIT. Davis goes on: “…Binmore attributes to people (learning and empathy) and makes his self-organizing conception of the individual not only an evolutionary but also a relational one (p. 159).” Yes. Relational conditioned by empathy-with ensures evolution.
Part 3 Socially Embedded Individuals
Davis gets the notion that a Human is embedded within the larger community, the larger society. DIT gets it too, the path 0M an abstract representation of that community, that interest shared with the other in society.
Evolution and Capabilities: Human Heterogeneity
Davis points to how “The evolutionary, or evolutionary-relational, individual conception developed in the previous chapter explains how individuals and their forms of interaction coevolve according to a line of thinking that draws on Simon’s feedback idea, finds development in the context of markets in Smith, is explained in terms of human capacities by Binmore, and is applied across multiple interrelated sites of interaction by Arthur (p. 169).” Davis goes on to claim the need to replace the idea of both preferences and capacities with the idea of capabilities.
Davis sees “Characterizing individuals as collections of capabilities … also opens the door to the possibility that individuals are sets of multiple selves… (p. 170).” DIT clarifies that one can have alternative path 0Z trajectories, which reflect said multiple selves. Also, there is the matter of subselves, as in path 0G self and path 0M self, integrated on path 0Z.
Brings up Sen’s ideas of Functionings… “(which) represent parts of the state of a person – in particular the various things that he or she manages to do or be in leading a life” (Sen 1993, 31). Indeed, practically anything we can say about people in connection with distinctively human activities and states of being counts as a functioning. Functionings can range from things that are socially significant, such as being in good health or being employed, to things that are comparatively inconsequential… particular hobby or remembering childhood experiences (p. 172)… The capability of a person reflects the alternative combinations of functionings the person can achieve … (quoting Sen on p. 172).”
Davis points out that Sen “… criticizes utilitarianism for its one-dimensional character… “ focused only on pleasure (p. 175).” Pleasure is on path 0G, but much more is at play, as in the Ethical --- what the reasoned other can go along with, and agreed too --- as represented on path 0M. In DIT framing, the focus shifts to the private capabilities to move up path 0G, the public (shared) capabilities to move up path 0M, and the joint private & public, self & other-capabilities to move up path 0Z. The interaction of the two capabilities serves in a role that “functions homeostatically (p. 177).” Absolutely. Homeostatic regulation takes place on path 0Z. And, naturally, Human heterogeneity arises a different Humans pursue different homeostatic path 0Z trajectories.
And, then, on mainstream economics: “Neoclassicism’s Homo economicus remains a static being and thus cannot tell us very much about what rising human heterogeneity means for economic life … economics will need to say much more about the increasingly complex character of individuality if it is to explain the evolving nature of economic life… the capabilities approach is meant to achieve in its attention to human diversity (p. 190).” Homo economicus lives on path 0G, period. Heterogeneity --- reality --- points to many path 0Z trajectories as one lives through life, and makes economic choices.
The Identity of Individuals and the Economics of Identity
Davis turns to the matter of personal identity that might be stable through time. In DIT terms, it is the possibility for autonomy on path 0G. It could arise in “… the freedom to deny others’ social identity assignments (p. 207).” Just deny relevance of path 0M. It could also be maintained through the “… individuals’ interpretation of the abstract social categories appropriate to their relational identities from the perspective of their first-person representations of their social roles (p. 207).” Interpret: Pay little to no attention to path 0M considerations.
Davis also points to how “… first-person representations are different from third-person ones, and so people have the discretion to use the former to determine how and whether they will observe the latter (p. 207).” Discretion is to stay on path 0G rather than go to the better path 0Z, which is generally not a good idea, but, ego-based self-interest takes people to path 0G a lot of the time. An individual also has the “… motivational grounds for reinterpreting the meaning and force of claims on them regarding ‘what people typically should do’… the freedom to reason and deliberate about the meaning of one’s social identities (p. 207).” Homonomy at play.
So, an individual can have “…a relative autonomy with respect to their relational identities, though in this case this autonomy has its basis in the nature of the individual as a self-organizing being developing capabilities; whereas in the case of collective social identities, the emphasis lies on how individuals respond to and interpret the social categories involved (p. 208).” Capabilities developed on path 0G along with capabilities developed on path 0M lead to even more capabilities on path 0Z.
Davis then asks the question: “How can someone be said to have a personal identity if what that involves continually change (p. 209)?” Easy. The person is stable on path 0G, but considers being someone sensitized to the regularly evolving and changing, and shared other-interest of path 0M trajectories.
Economic Policy, Democracy, and Justice References
Bringing the book to a the point of using the capabilities approach, and, in effect recognizing the the dual interest reflected in DIT, Davis points to the historic attempt at a strong separation between positive and normative economics. So, economics “… eliminates a whole range of fundamental normative concerns – fairness, rights, justice, equality, and so forth – from the domain of economic policy (pp. 215-216).” As DIT clarifies, SIT sees only self-interest on path 0G, and does not see fairness, justice, rights, equality which all have to do with the shared other-interest on path 0M. Davis says “Economists have long insulated their policy recommendation process from this larger social value space by remaining steadfast in their commitment to an asocial conception of the individual (p. 217).” DIT fixes it by bringing in the social from the Other Forum space in Figure 2 to influence how the person reconciles path 0G and path 0M in the Market Forum Figure 1 space.
Davis claims that using the capabilities approach seeing dual interests suggests “Economic policy … depends on how people deliberate over the relationships between these different values as well as the social conditions under which this process of deliberation occurs (p. 218)… When operating with a capabilities conception of individuals, then, economic policy recommendation ought to promote human rights, trust and responsibility, and individual dignity (p. 224).” Said shared other-interest is all represented on path 0M.
Davis claims values are closely aligned with capabilities: “…just as they are with respect to their capabilities, as we would expect because both develop in interaction with others and people’s capabilities and values are no doubt closely associated (p. 228).” And, on value pluralism and justice: Need consensus, while behind the Veil of Ignorance drawing on Rawls: “If anyone after due reflection prefers a conception of justice to another, then they all do, and a unanimous agreement can be reached. (referring to Rawls) (pp. 230-231)”. So, it is a subset of each person’s shared other-interest (which overall is value pluralistic) that produces justice for all.
Goes to Sen, who sees: “… more is needed … a widespread conviction that the process of public reasoning is fair and impartial, as Rawls had originally argued in characterizing justice as fairness … and … Adam Smith captured even more effectively in his Theory of Moral Sentiments with his idea of an impartial spectator open to seeing things from any point of view (reference Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments book) (p. 233).” Yes: Smith’s Impartial Spectator is about the mindfulness of going into empathy-with the other, widely conceived, on the trajectory to finding justice for all.
Individuals are embedded in the larger society: “… a capabilities conception of individuals as socially embedded on the grounds that we cannot really understand individual capabilities except in a social world in which we see how they are exercised (pp. 233-234).” Absolutely. Embedded in a milieu of path 0M trajectories. And, Davis continues “… that in an evolutionary world seeing individuals as self-organizing depends on assuming that they have certain fundamental capacities – learning and empathy – (p. 234).” Yes, absolutely: evolutionary biologist Wilson (2015) makes clear that altruism is key to Human evolution, and, it runs on empathy-with on the learning path about what works for a successful evolution. Selfishness must be tempered by selflessness, giving a sustainable identity with the capability to achieve a successful evolution on path 0Z. DIT supports the contention, and gives analytical content to addressing the matter of what identity works best in a successfully evolving economic system.
Davis ends the book, last paragraph (p. 236): “Of course, the capabilities conception of the individual developed here possesses many ambiguities and problematic aspects, as one would expect of any examination of individuals and identity. However, if my discussion has often not been persuasive, I hope to at least have convinced readers of the seriousness of the issue and its fundamental importance.” And, overall, the capabilities approach developed by Davis also means developing capabilities not only on path 0G, but also in what one shares with the other as represented on path 0M in DIT. The overall capability --- joint private & social (public) capability --- is then jointly applied on path 0Z, where the economic identity is made clear.
DIT Gains Credence from the Capabilities Characterization of Identity, and the Capabilities Characterization Gains Credence from DIT
Overall, DIT is given more credence by the claims in Davis, and the claims in Davis are given not only more credence by DIT, but can now be analytically considered in the empirically based theoretical system of DIT. Also, while identity can stay relatively stable like SIT suggests on some self-interest only path 0G, reidentification through time evolves in the balance in self & other (shared relationships) -interest, multiple selves coming and going as the balance shifts through time on path 0Z. The puzzle on which Davis is working is easily characterized with DIT to help make sense of identity on path 0G and reidentification on an ever-changing path 0Z due to interacting with the other over time. Puzzle solved.
References
Davis, John B. 2011. Individuals and Identity in Economics. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Lynne, Gary D and Natalia V. Czap. 2023. "Towards a Dual Interest Theory in Metaeconomics." Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics (July):1-19.
Lynne, Gary D. In review. “Cargo-Cult Economics to Metaeconomics: Toward a Humanomics with a Theory.” Review of Behavioral Economics.
Wilson, David Sloan. 2015. Does Altruism Exist? Culture, Genes, and the Welfare of Others (Foundational Questions in Science). Yale University Press.
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